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Abstract:We aim to clarify the role of access charges under two-way
network competition, employing a reduced-form approach. Retaining
the key features of specific network competition models but imposing
less structure, we analyze the impact of changes in access charges on
linear and non-linear retail prices. We derive suﬃcient conditions for
usage fees to be increasing (and subscriber charges to be decreasing) in
access charges. These conditions are shown to be satisfied only under
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implementing collusion by inflating access charges is likely to be non-
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1 Introduction
The problem of setting the ‘right’ access charge in the telecommunications
industry has been analyzed extensively. There appears to be a broad consen-
sus that access charges need to be regulated in the case of one-way access,
where the incumbent monopolist controls an essential facility (e.g. the local
fixed network) and competes with entrants in related markets (e.g. long dis-
tance services).1 In contrast, the debate on the problem of two-way access is
far from settled. This problem arises in more mature industries, where the
incumbent faces competitors that have deployed their own network facilities,
so that mutual access is required to place calls to all subscribers. In this
setting, it is less than obvious that access charges should be regulated, as
competition for end users may, at least in principle, discipline both access
and retail prices.
In two seminal papers, Armstrong (1998) and Laﬀont, Rey and Tirole
(1998a)–henceforth abbreviated by ALRT–have put forward a formal frame-
work for analyzing the role of access charges under two-way network compe-
tition. One of the key findings of these papers is that the access charge may
serve as an instrument of collusion when networks compete in linear retail
prices. To some extent, this result is intuitive: Increasing the access charge
is equivalent to increasing the competitor’s perceived marginal cost, thereby
softening competition in the retail market. This “raise-each-other’s-cost ef-
fect” (Laﬀont and Tirole 2000, 190) might suggest that access charges should
also be regulated in the case of two-way network competition.2
Based on the ALRT framework, a number of contributions surveyed in
Laﬀont and Tirole (2000), Armstrong (2002), Vogelsang (2003), and Peitz
et al. (2004) have emphasized that the collusive role of access charges is less
robust than one might think.3 In particular, if retail tariﬀs are non-linear
1See e.g. Laﬀont and Tirole (2000, chapters 3 and 4) for a survey of the relevant issues.
2Note that the usage of the word “collusion” in this context is debatable, as it neither
refers to an explicit agreement nor to implicit collusion in a repeated game sense: Higher
access charges merely move the industry to an equilibrium with both higher retail prices
and profits.
3See, e.g., Gans and King (2001), Schiﬀ (2002), Carter and Wright (2003), Dessein
(2003, 2004), and Armstrong (2004).
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and/or customers are heterogenous, it is far from obvious that usage fees are
increasing in access charges (Dessein 2003). Thus, even when firms are free
to set access prices themselves, they do not necessarily price above marginal
costs.
In the present paper, we aim to clarify the role of access charges under
network competition with two-way access, using a reduced-form approach.
Because we focus on comparative statics issues, we need a less restrictive
structure than usual in this literature. We retain the following key features
of the various models considered in the literature that are motivated by the
real world:
(i) Facing access charges, firms set their retail prices;
(ii) Facing retail prices, consumers take their subscription decisions;
(iii) The calling pattern, that is, the number of internal and external calls
initiated in each network, is a function of both the size of the two
networks and the retail price charged by that network.
We do not, however, impose some of the simplifying assumptions that
are routinely applied in the literature. Instead, we start out more generally
and then discuss to what extent assumptions familiar from the literature bias
the results. Our findings support the view that the collusive role of access
charges is generally not very robust. We argue that this non-robustness is
associated with the underlying economics of two-way network competition
rather than the various simplifying assumptions made for studying specific
models.
Below, we first consider the case of linear retail prices. For this setting,
we confirm that (i) even in cases where higher access charges do increase
equilibrium retail prices, the raise-each-other’s cost intuition is incomplete
(for reasons to be discussed below); (ii) it is not evident that higher ac-
cess charges increase retail prices, so that collusion based on inflated access
charges might not be a concern to begin with. Put diﬀerently, we show that
it is neither clear that higher access prices shift out reaction curves in the
retail price game, nor that reaction curves are upward sloping. We then
demonstrate that the standard assumptions of full coverage networks and
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balanced calling patterns tend to support the collusive role of access charges,
without making it robust. We also show that retail prices definitely increase
under either of the following (rather extreme) assumptions: (i) networks are
symmetric; (ii) the total number of subscribers and the number of subscribers
to each network are fixed.
We then move on to non-linear retail prices. Laﬀont et al. (1998a) and
Dessein (2003) argue that if networks compete in two-part retail tariﬀs, an
increase of the access charge still increases the variable component of the
two-part tariﬀ, but also lowers the fixed component so as to just oﬀset any
eﬀects on profits. Again, we aim to clarify the intuition behind this result and
its limitations using our reduced-form framework. To this end, we formulate
a general comparative statics result that leads to the desired conclusion. We
then show that the required conditions are fairly intuitive, but may well be
violated in reasonable cases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
our reduced-form model for linear retail prices. Section 3 discusses how two
simplifying assumptions familiar from the literature, full coverage networks
and balanced calling patterns, aﬀect the comparative statics with respect
to access charges. Section 4 extends the analysis to non-linear retail tariﬀs.
Section 5 discusses further extensions and concludes.
2 Linear Retail Prices
In this section, we introduce a reduced-form model of two-way network com-
petition with linear retail prices, imposing very little structure on the demand
for calls within and across networks. We consider more specific models fa-
miliar from the literature in the next section.
2.1 Assumptions
Consider a reduced-form model of two-way network competition with the
following structural elements:
• Cost structure: There are two networks with identical cost structure.
There is a marginal cost c0 per call at the originating and terminating
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end of a call and c1 in between. Total marginal cost is thus given by
c ≡ 2c0 + c1, as in Laﬀont et al. (1998a).4 There is a fixed cost Ki of
operating network i.
• Demand structure: The networks are diﬀerentiated and compete in
retail prices. We abstract both from the type of network diﬀerentiation
and the details of the consumers’ subscription decisions and simply
assume that there is a well-defined demand function for each of the
various types of calls. More specifically, let i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. Then
Dii(pi, pj) denotes the demand for calls initiated and terminated in
network i. Similarly, Dij(pi, pj) denotes the demand for calls initiated
in network i and terminated in network j. Suppose that each of these
demand functions is twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
The profit function of network i is thus given by
πi(pi, pj) = (pi − c)Dii(pi, pj) + (pi − aj − c1 − c0)Dij(pi, pj) (1)
+ (ai − c0)Dji(pi, pj)−Ki,
where ai and aj denote the access charges set by network i and j, respectively,
i.e., the prices to be paid for terminating a call initiated in the competing
network. Even though we shall formulate our main comparative statics result
in terms of the reduced-form demand functions Dii and Dij, it will be useful
to decompose these functions into (i) the number of subscribers, and (ii)
the number of calls initiated by each subscriber. We therefore introduce the
following notation:
Notation 1 (demand with linear tariﬀs) For i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, we let
ni(pi, pj) denote the number of subscribers to network i. Further, letbmii (pi, pj) ≡ mii (ni (pi, pj) , nj (pi, pj) , pi) denote the number of inter-
nal calls per subscriber and bmij (pi, pj) ≡ mij (ni (pi, pj) , nj (pi, pj) , pi) the
number of external calls per subscriber to network i. Then, the demand
4In our framework, it would be straightforward to incorporate asymmetric marginal
costs. However, doing so would make the notation more cumbersome, without changing
the results.
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functions can be written as
Dii (pi, pj) ≡ ni (pi, pj) · bmii (pi, pj) ,
Dij (pi, pj) ≡ ni (pi, pj) · bmij (pi, pj) .
Understanding the demand functions Dii and Dij thus amounts to un-
derstanding the relation between retail prices and (a) the individuals’ sub-
scription decisions (represented by ni and nj), and (b) the number of calls
per subscriber (bmii and bmij, respectively). Note that a subscriber’s demandbmii for internal calls depends not only on the price pi per call, but also on
the number of subscribers to each network: A customer of a large network
i will place more internal calls than a customer of a small network. Hence,
indirectly bmii depends on pj as well as pi, since pj aﬀects the numbers of
customers in both networks and thus the calling pattern of each subscriber
to network i. As a result, the total eﬀect of a change in the retail price pi on
the number of internal calls per subscriber, bmii, is given by
∂ bmii
∂pi
=
∂mii
∂pi
+
∂mii
∂ni
∂ni
∂pi
+
∂mii
∂nj
∂nj
∂pi
, (2)
and similarly for the eﬀect on external calls, ∂ bmij/∂pi. The total eﬀect of a
change in the competitor’s retail price pj on the number of internal calls per
subscriber is given by
∂ bmij
∂pj
=
∂mij
∂ni
∂ni
∂pj
+
∂mij
∂nj
∂nj
∂pj
, (3)
and similarly for ∂ bmii/∂pj.
We maintain the following assumptions on the components of demand.
Assumption 1 (demand properties) The components of demand satisfy
the following properties:
(i) ni,mii and mij are diﬀerentiable functions.
(ii) ∂ni/∂pi < 0; ∂ni/∂pj > 0.
(iii) ∂mii/∂ni > 0; ∂mii/∂nj < 0.
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(iv) ∂mii/∂pi < 0; ∂mii/∂pj > 0.
(v) ∂mij/∂pi < 0.
Assumption (i) is made for notational convenience only. The remaining
assumptions are plausible properties of the demand components. Assumption
(ii), for instance, reflects the substitution eﬀect associated with an increase
of a network’s retail price.5 Property (iii) formalizes the notion that an
increase in the size of a network should increase (decrease) the number of
internal calls per subscriber in this (the competitor’s) network. Property (iv)
reflects substitution eﬀects for internal calls. Finally, property (v) states that
the demand for external calls per subscriber is downward sloping.
Note that Assumption 1 implies
∂ bmii
∂pi
< 0 and
∂ bmii
∂pj
> 0,
but no corresponding statement on ∂ bmij/∂pi and ∂ bmij/∂pj. We illustrate
the ambiguity for ∂ bmij/∂pj using (3). By Assumption 1(ii), ∂ni/∂pj > 0 and
∂nj/∂pj < 0, whereas the signs of the remaining partials are not determined.
Under the reasonable condition that the number of external calls per sub-
scriber is increasing in the size of both networks (∂mij/∂ni > 0, ∂mij/∂nj >
0)–more subscribers to network i are likely to place more calls to network j,
and more subscribers to network j make it more likely that subscribers want
to place calls to network j–the sign of ∂ bmij/∂pj is ambiguous.6
Our next assumption is made for convenience and requires that the com-
ponents of demand are separable.
Assumption 2 (separability) The demand components are separable in
retail prices, i.e.
∂2ni
∂pi∂pj
= 0,
∂ bmij
∂pi∂pj
= 0, and
∂2ij bmij
∂pi∂pj
= 0.
5In the absence of a full coverage assumption (see Section 3.1 for details), the second
part of this assumption is not quite as natural: In principle, because an increase in pj
reduces nj , it might also make subscription to network i less attractive.
6The arguments for ∂ bmij/∂pi are analogous.
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Note that Assumption 2 does not imply separability of the demand func-
tions Dii and Dij themselves.7
Finally, since we want to focus on comparative statics, we need to assume
that an equilibrium exists. It is well-known from specific models of two-
way network competition that the existence of equilibrium is not assured,
especially if access charges and the substitutability of networks are high.
2.2 Comparative Statics
We now carry out comparative statics with respect to access prices. The
analytical framework put forward by ALRT suggests that by “raising each
others’ cost”, access charges may serve as collusive devices. Very roughly,
the following intuition might appear plausible: By making access to its net-
work more costly, both firms shift out the competitor’s reaction curve. If
retail prices are strategic complements, indirect eﬀects reinforce the direct
eﬀects. Though this story bears a grain of truth (Laﬀont and Tirole 2000,
189), it is both misleading and incomplete. First, it ignores the role of access
charges as a means of generating revenue. Second, it neglects some spe-
cial characteristics of network competition suggesting that retail prices are
strategic substitutes in the demand function rather than complements. Once
these issues are taken into account, it is neither obvious that higher access
charges shift out reaction curves nor that indirect eﬀects work into the ‘right
direction’.
Nevertheless, we start with a simple result that formalizes the intuitive
argument for collusion laid out above by giving suﬃcient conditions for equi-
librium retail prices to be increasing in access charges.8
Proposition 1 (linear tariﬀs) Suppose that for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, retail
7For instance, under Assumption 2, we have
∂2Dii
∂pi∂pj
=
∂ni
∂pj
∂ bmii
∂pi
+
∂ni
∂pi
∂ bmii
∂pj
.
8The proposition is formulated for a unique equilibrium of the price game. It generalizes
to equilibrium sets as in Milgrom and Roberts (1990).
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prices are strategic complements, i.e.,
∂2πi
∂pi∂pj
=
∂Dii
∂pj
+
∂Dij
∂pj
+ (pi − c)
∂2Dii
∂pi∂pj
+ (pi − aj − c0)
∂2Dij
∂pi∂pj
+ (aj − c0)
∂2Dji
∂pi∂pj
≥ 0. (4)
(i) If, in addition to (4), reaction curves shift outwards, i.e.,
∂2πi
∂pi∂ai
=
∂Dji
∂pi
≥ 0 and ∂
2πj
∂pj∂ai
= −∂Dji
∂pj
> 0, (5)
then the equilibrium of the price game is increasing in ai.
(ii) If, in addition to (4) both firms face the same access price a and
∂2πi
∂pi∂a
=
∂Dji
∂pi
− ∂Dij
∂pi
> 0, (6)
then the equilibrium of the price game is increasing in a.
Proof. Results (i) and (ii) follow immediately from Milgrom and Roberts
(1990, Th. 5): Condition (4) guarantees that the game is supermodular;
conditions (5) and (6) make sure that it satisfies increasing diﬀerences in
(pi, pj; θ) , with θ = ai or a, respectively.
Result (i) guarantees that both retail prices increase when either firm
raises its access charge. The result is thus directly relevant for cases where
firms themselves choose access charges–cooperatively or non-cooperatively–
and compete in the retail market, highlighting the collusive role of access
charges. Result (ii) concerns the eﬀects of a simultaneous increase in both
access prices. It pertains to the important case where either the regulatory
regime requires access charges to be reciprocal (as, e.g., in the U.S.) or the
network operators negotiate symmetric access charges.
We now explore whether the suﬃcient conditions for a collusive role of
access charges ((4), (5) and (6)) are likely to be satisfied.
2.3 Are Retail Prices Strategic Complements?
In standard models of oligopolistic price competition, there is a natural force
towards strategic complementarity of pricing decisions: If the competitors
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produce substitutes, a higher price of firm j increases the demand of firm i.
Thus, a price increase of firm i becomes more attractive as it applies to a
greater number of inframarginal consumption units. The strategic comple-
mentarity of pricing decisions breaks down only if the demand function itself
has negative cross-partials, that is, if prices are strategic substitutes in the
demand function, and this eﬀect is suﬃciently strong.
For network competition models with two-sided access, there are two nat-
ural reasons why strategic complementarity in retail prices may be violated,
so that ∂2πi/∂pi∂pj < 0 at least for some prices:
(i) The products oﬀered by diﬀerent networks are not necessarily substi-
tutes, i.e. the demand for calls oﬀered by network i does not necessarily
increase with an increase in network j’s retail price.
(ii) The retail prices may be strategic substitutes in the demand functions,
i.e. the cross-partials of the demand functions may be negative.
First consider reason (i). Observe that by Assumption 1
∂Dii
∂pj
= mii
∂ni
∂pj
+ ni
∂ bmii
∂pj
> 0, (7)
i.e., the demand for internal calls is unambiguously increasing in the com-
petitor’s retail price. The eﬀect on the demand for external calls,
∂Dij
∂pj
= mij
∂ni
∂pj
+ ni
∂ bmij
∂pj
, (8)
however, is less clear: The first term is positive by Assumption 1(ii), but
the second term has an ambiguous sign, so that it is not guaranteed that
∂Dij/∂pj > 0. Intuitively, higher competitor prices might have a negative
eﬀect on the size of the competitor’s network and thereby reduce the number
of outgoing calls. Nevertheless, (7) and (8) together suggest that the total
eﬀect on demand (∂Dii/∂pj + ∂Dij/∂pj) is likely to be positive, supporting
strategic complementarity in retail prices.
Consider now reason (ii). On the one hand, a familiar force towards
strategic complementarity is present: As ∂Dii/∂pj > 0, a higher competitor
price increases own demand for internal calls, which makes a price increase
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more valuable. On the other hand, it is important to note that there is a
natural force towards a negative cross-partial for the demand function Dii, in
spite of our separability assumption on the underlying demand components.
Using Assumptions 1 and 2, as well as the decomposition given in (7), we
obtain
∂2Dii
∂pi∂pj
=
∂ni
∂pj
∂ bmii
∂pi
+
∂ni
∂pi
∂ bmii
∂pj
< 0,
which is unambiguously negative. Intuitively, an increase in the competitor’s
retail price increases both the number of own subscribers and the volume of
internal calls per subscriber. The same is true for a reduction in own retail
price. Thus, with a higher competitor price, the positive eﬀect of an own price
reduction on demand per subscriber applies to a greater customer base, so
that the demand-enhancing eﬀect of the price reduction is more pronounced.
Similarly, the positive eﬀect on the subscriber number applies to a greater
call volume per subscriber.
The argument for the remaining cross partials is again less clear-cut. For
instance, we obtain
∂2Dij
∂pi∂pj
=
∂ni
∂pj
∂ bmij
∂pi
+
∂ni
∂pi
∂ bmij
∂pj
,
which has an ambiguous sign: We know that ∂ni/∂pj > 0, ∂ni/∂pi < 0
by Assumption 1(ii), but ∂ bmij/∂pi and ∂ bmij/∂pj have ambiguous signs. A
similar result holds for ∂2Dji/∂pi∂pj.
Summing up, our reduced-form model of network competition with linear
retail prices incorporates the standard argument for the strategic complemen-
tarity of pricing decisions: If a higher competitor price increases the total
demand for calls originating in network i, then own price increases are more
valuable. There is, however, at least one natural counter-eﬀect: A higher
competitor price exacerbates the negative demand eﬀects of an increase in
own price, yielding an incentive to reduce own price.
2.4 Do Higher Access Charges Shift Out the Reaction
Curves?
The strategic complementarity of pricing decisions in the retail market helps
support the argument for collusion among network operators. However, it is
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not a necessary condition for retail prices to be increasing in access charges.
As long as higher access charges shift out reaction curves, both retail prices
will go up even if retail prices are strategic substitutes, unless the indirect
eﬀects from downward sloping reaction curves are very strong. Conversely,
if higher access prices shift reaction curves inward, retail prices are likely to
fall. In the following, we show that the latter case may arise in the present
setting.
We first suppose that only one firm’s access price, ai, increases. This
implies an outward shift of firm i’s reaction curve if
∂2πi
∂pi∂ai
=
∂Dji
∂pi
> 0. (9)
That is, if a higher retail price induces more incoming calls, then setting a
higher retail price is a reasonable response to a higher access charge. As we
argued before, however, this condition may be violated (see (8)).
Next, we ask whether it is natural to expect firm j’s reaction curve to
shift outwards when the competitor raises its access price. Such an outward
shift occurs if the following condition holds:
∂2πj
∂pj∂ai
= −∂Dji
∂pj
> 0. (10)
(10) requires that the demand for network j’s outgoing calls falls as it raises
its retail price. Then, the increasing costs of access to network i make it
attractive for network j to curb demand for external calls by increasing its
retail price pj. As argued in before, it is not obvious that ∂Dji/∂pj is negative.
Summing up, it is not clear that increases in access charges shift out the
reaction curves of both firms.
3 Simplifying Assumptions: How Do They
Aﬀect the Role of Access Charges?
Our above findings indicate that changes in access charges have subtle eﬀects
on retail prices. In particular, they suggest that the collusive role of access
charges is not very robust even when retail prices are linear. We now want to
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explore to what extent the following two crucial assumptions familiar from
the literature aﬀect the role of access charges under network competition (see
Vogelsang 2003, p. 846): (i) Full coverage networks, and (ii) balanced calling
patterns.
3.1 Full Coverage Networks
In the ALRT framework, the focus is on mature industries where network
competition involves competition between two full-coverage networks (see,
e.g., Laﬀont et al. 1998a, 5), and all consumers subscribe to one of the net-
works. This implies that the total number of subscribers is fixed, i.e.
ni (pi, pj) + nj (pi, pj) ≡ n. (11)
Therefore, retail prices only aﬀect the networks’ market shares
αi (pi, pj) ≡
ni (pi, pj)
n
, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, (12)
but not the total number of subscribers (i.e., the “size” of the market).
This simplification tends to support the collusive role of access charges,
without eliminating the ambiguities entirely. Too see this, note that if (11)
holds, we immediately have ∂ni/∂pi = −∂nj/∂pi.We can thus rewrite (3) as
∂ bmij
∂pj
=
∂ni
∂pj
µ
∂mij
∂ni
− ∂mij
∂nj
¶
, (13)
which is positive by Assumption 1(ii) if and only if the expression in the
bracket is positive. One might argue that this condition is likely to be sat-
isfied, since it essentially requires that the number of external calls per sub-
scriber increases more strongly in own network size than it increases in the
competitor’s network size (the own eﬀect dominates the cross eﬀect).9 If this
condition is satisfied, we have ∂ bmij/∂pj > 0, which reinforces the positive
9It should be noted, however, that in this particular case, it is not a foregone conclusion
that the own eﬀect dominates the cross eﬀect: The demand for external calls per subscriber
should be expected to increase in the number of subscribers to both networks, and without
further assumptions on how subscribers choose networks, it is perfectly conceivable that
the cross eﬀect dominates.
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eﬀect of an increase in network j’s retail price on network i’s total demand,
i.e. the full coverage assumption supports the strategic complementarity of
retail price decisions.
However, the full coverage assumption does not eliminate the natural
counter-eﬀect associated with the negative cross-partial of internal calls. Sim-
ilar arguments show that the full coverage assumption makes it more likely
(but cannot guarantee) that an increase in the access charge shifts out the
competitor’s reaction curve. Summing up, the full coverage assumption tends
to support the collusive role of access charges, but does not guarantee a pos-
itive relation between access charges and retail prices.
The ambiguities concerning the collusive role of access charges disappear,
however, if we are willing to make a more extreme assumption and fix not
only the total number of subscribers, but also the number of subscribers to
each network. Making this assumption is equivalent to ignoring subscription
decisions, which could be justified on the grounds of prohibitive switching
costs in a very short-term perspective. In this simpler setting, our earlier
concerns about strategic complementarity and the shifting of reaction curves
disappear. To see this, consider the strategic complementarity condition (4).
The potential counter-eﬀect of the competitor’s retail price on external calls,
∂Dij/∂pj, is zero by assumption: If pj does not aﬀect ni and nj, it cannot
aﬀect bmij either. Second, all demand functions are now separable in retail
prices, as ∂ni/∂pi = ∂ni/∂pj = 0 by assumption. Therefore, condition (4)
is always satisfied with equality. As to the conditions (9) and (10) assur-
ing that increases in access charges shift out the reaction curves, we have
∂2πi/∂pi∂ai = ∂Dji/∂pi = 0, since pi does not aﬀect nj. Furthermore, by
Assumption 1(v), ∂2πj/∂pj∂ai = −∂Dji/∂pj = −nj (∂mji/∂pj) > 0. There-
fore, access charge increases unambiguously shift out the reaction curves of
the competitors.
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3.2 Full Coverage Networks and Balanced Calling Pat-
tern
Another common simplification in the literature is to require a so-called bal-
anced calling pattern.10 This means that, at retail prices pi = pj, inbound
and outbound calls are balanced. According to Laﬀont et al. (1998a, 3), who
used the assumption as a “good first approximation” to the possibly com-
plex routing of calls within and across networks, balanced calling patterns
also mean that the
“percentage of calls originating on a network and completed
on the same network (“on-net calls”) is equal to the fraction of
consumers subscribing to the same network.”
We now want to explore how this assumption aﬀects the role of access
charges for network competition. We maintain the full coverage assumption
from Section 3.1, so that αi = ni(pi, pj)/n.11 Using the notation of Laﬀont
et al. (1998a), our reduced-form demand functions then read
Dii(pi, pj) = α2i (pi, pj)q(pi), (14)
Dij(pi, pj) = αi(pi, pj) (1− αi(pi, pj)) q(pi), (15)
where q(pi) denotes the call volume per subscriber to network i, with q0(pi) <
0. Note that the call volume per subscriber is a function of pi alone, whereas
in our reduced-form model above, it is a function of both pi and pj.12
10Vogelsang (2003, 847) uses the terminology ‘isotropic calling pattern’ instead.
11With the balanced calling pattern assumption, calculations for the reduced-form model
become tedious when the total number of subscribers is endogenous.
12In a paper closely related to Laﬀont et al. (1998a), Dessein (2003) combines the as-
sumptions of full coverage and balanced calling patterns with a more flexible demand
structure where subscribers may be heterogeneous in the sense that there are light and
heavy users initiating call volumes kLq(pi) and kHq(pi), respectively, with kL < kH . He
finds that in this setting the equilibrium price is still increasing in the access charge (Propo-
sition 1). If, however, the calling pattern is unbalanced, the impact of an increase in the
access charge on the equilibrium price may be reversed (Proposition 2). See Section 5 for
a discussion of consumer heterogeneity in our reduced-form model.
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It is straightforward to show that these assumptions do not resolve the
ambiguities outlined above. For instance, consider the strategic complemen-
tarity condition (4). Using (14) and (15), we have
∂Dii
∂pj
= 2αi
∂αi
∂pj
q(pi) > 0, (16)
∂Dij
∂pj
=
∂αi
∂pj
(1− 2αi)q(pi). (17)
While (16) is always positive, (17) is positive by Assumption 1(ii) for a small
network (αi < 1/2) and negative for a large network (αi > 1/2). That is, from
a large network’s point of view, the products oﬀered by the diﬀerent networks
are no substitutes. Furthermore, some of the cross-partials of demand may
be negative. More specifically, we have
∂2Dii
∂pi∂pj
= 2
∂αi
∂pj
µ
∂αi
∂pi
q(pi) + αiq0(pi)
¶
< 0, (18)
∂2Dij
∂pi∂pj
=
∂αi
∂pj
(1− 2αi)q0(pi)− 2
∂αi
∂pj
∂αi
∂pi
q(pi). (19)
Condition (18) indicates that ∂2Dii/∂pi∂pj is always negative, whereas the
sign of ∂2Dij/∂pi∂pj is ambiguous (see (19)). Thus, the strategic comple-
mentarity condition may well be violated.
Furthermore, reaction curves do not generally shift out when access charges
increase. To see this, note that
∂2πi
∂pi∂ai
=
∂Dji
∂pi
=
∂αi
∂pi
(1− 2αi)q(pj),
∂2πj
∂pj∂ai
= −∂Dji
∂pj
= −∂αi
∂pj
(1− 2αi)q(pj)− αiαjq0(pj).
That is, raising the access charge and increasing the retail price is comple-
mentary only from a large network’s point of view (αi > 1/2). A small
network (αi < 1/2), in turn, will not be willing to increase its retail price in
response to an increase in its own access charge. To understand this, recall
that setting a higher retail price is a reasonable response to a higher access
charge if it induces more incoming calls. Under the assumptions of full cov-
erage networks and balanced calling patterns, increasing the retail price will
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induce more incoming calls only for a large network, whereas a small network
must reduce the retail price to induce more incoming calls.
Interestingly, all of the above ambiguities disappear when networks are
symmetric (αi = αj = 1/2). In this case, all relevant derivatives are either
zero or strictly positive, so that the conditions of Proposition 1 are satisfied.
In particular, the diverging interests of small and large networks in setting
retail prices in response to changes in access charges are perfectly aligned,
and increasing access charges (weakly) shifts out reaction curves.
4 Non-linear Retail Tariﬀs
We now introduce a reduced-form model of two-way network competition
with non-linear retail tariﬀs that incorporates the ALRT framework as a
special case.
4.1 Assumptions
Suppose that the networks simultaneously oﬀer two-part retail tariﬀs of the
form
Ti(q) = Fi + piq,
where Fi is a subscriber charge and pi is the per-unit usage fee. Following
Laﬀont et al. (1998a), we denote the variable gross surplus of a subscriber to
network i by u(mii,mij), and the corresponding variable net surplus by
v(pi) ≡ max
mii,mij
{u(mii,mij)− pi(mii +mij)}.
Accounting for the subscriber charge, the net surplus oﬀered to subscribers
of network i is
wi ≡ v(pi)− Fi.
For a fixed retail price pi, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the
subscriber charge Fi and the net surplus wi, so that we can view the networks
as simultaneously choosing pi and wi. Also, we confine ourselves to the case
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of reciprocal access charges ai = aj ≡ a. Thus, we write the profit function
of firm i as
πi(wi, wj; pi, pj) = (pi − c)Dii(wi, wj; pi) + (pi − a− c1 − c0)Dij(wi, wj; pi)
+ (a− c0)Dji(wi, wj; pj) + ni (v(pi)− wi)−Ki.
We shall provide a comparative statics result for this reduced form below, but
we shall also refer to the following decompositions of the demand functions.
Notation 2 (demand with non-linear tariﬀs) For i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, we
let ni(wi, wj) denote the number of subscribers to network i. Further, letbmii(wi, wj; pi) ≡ mii (ni (wi, wj) , nj (wi, wj) , pi) denote the number of in-
ternal calls per subscriber and bmij(wi, wj; pi) ≡ mij (ni (pi, pj) , nj (pi, pj) , pi)
the number of external calls per subscriber to network i. Then, the de-
mand functions can be written as
Dii (wi, wj; pi) ≡ ni (wi, wj) · bmii(wi, wj; pi),
Dij (wi, wj; pi) ≡ ni (wi, wj) · bmij(wi, wj; pi).
The net surpluses (wi, wj) thus both determine the customers’ subscrip-
tion decisions and aﬀect the number of calls per subscriber, whereas the
retail prices (pi, pj) only aﬀect the number of calls per subscriber. The total
eﬀect of a change in the net surplus wi on the number of internal calls per
subscriber, bmii, is given by
∂ bmii
∂wi
=
∂mii
∂ni
∂ni
∂wi
+
∂mii
∂nj
∂nj
∂wi
,
and similarly for ∂ bmii/∂wj . The total eﬀect of a change in the competitor’s
net surplus wj on the number of external calls is
∂ bmij
∂wj
=
∂mij
∂ni
∂ni
∂wj
+
∂mii
∂nj
∂nj
∂wj
,
and similarly for ∂ bmij/∂wi. We adapt Assumptions 1 and 2 from above in
the following way:
Assumption 1’ (demand properties) The components of demand satisfy
the following properties:
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(i) ni,mii and mij are diﬀerentiable functions.
(ii) ∂ni/∂wi > 0; ∂ni/∂wj < 0.
(iii) ∂mii/∂ni > 0; ∂mii/∂nj < 0.
(iv) ∂mii/∂pi< 0 .
(v) ∂mij/∂pi< 0 .
Assumption 2’ (separability) The demand components are separable in
retail prices and net surpluses, i.e.
∂2ni
∂wi∂wj
= 0,
∂2 bmii
∂wi∂wj
= 0, and
∂2 bmij
∂wi∂wj
= 0;
∂2 bmii
∂pi∂wi
= 0,
∂2 bmij
∂pi∂wi
= 0 .
4.2 Comparative Statics
We now discuss how changes in access charges aﬀect subscriber charges and
usage fees. To some extent the intuition will parallel the case of linear pricing.
However, there is added complexity from the interaction of usage fees pi and
subscriber charges Fi (or equivalently, net surpluses wi). The following three
arguments are key for the notion that both usage fees and net surpluses
should be increasing in access charges.
(i) Setting a higher access charge a increases the marginal benefits from
an increase in the usage fee pi.
(ii) Other things being equal, charging a higher usage fee pi increases the
marginal profitability from setting a higher net surplus wi (by lowering
the subscriber charge Fi). Intuitively, a network charging a high usage
fee benefits more from a larger customer base which it obtains thanks
to a low subscriber charge.
(iii) The diﬀerent players’ decision variables, which are now two-dimensional
(usage fee and net surplus), are strategic complements. Thus, a firm’s
optimal response to an increase of the usage fee and an increase of
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the net surplus of the competitor involves increasing its own usage fee
and increasing its own net surplus (i.e., reducing its own subscription
charge).
Using these arguments, the following response to an access charge increase
appears plausible. First, by (i), the direct eﬀect of a higher access charge is
to increase usage fees. Second, by (ii), if firms increase their usage fees, they
should reduce subscriber charges. Third, by (iii), these adjustments of both
firms to higher access charges reinforce each other.
The intuition is slightly incomplete, however, as one must also take the
direct eﬀect of higher access charges on subscription charges into account.
Unfortunately, neither the standard monopoly non-linear pricing problem,
nor the linear access pricing model of Section 2 oﬀers guidance for the sign of
this eﬀect. Next, we therefore state a comparative statics result that contains
a suitable condition on this direct eﬀect as well as formalizations of (i)—(iii)
above, and then discuss the plausibility of these conditions.
Proposition 2 (two-part tariﬀs) For the reduced-form model with two-
part retail tariﬀs, suppose the following conditions hold for i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j:
(i)
∂2πi
∂a∂pi
≥ 0; ∂
2πi
∂a∂wi
≥ 0;
(ii)
∂2πi
∂pi∂wi
≥ 0;
(iii)
∂2πi
∂pi∂pj
≥ 0; ∂
2πi
∂pi∂wj
≥ 0; ∂
2πi
∂wi∂pj
≥ 0; ∂
2πi
∂wi∂wj
≥ 0.
Then, an increase in the access charge a leads to an increase in
the equilibrium values of (p1, p2) and (w1, w2).
Proof. By (i), each objective function πi(pi, pj, wi, wj; a) has increasing
diﬀerences in (pi, wi; a). By condition (ii), the objective functions are super-
modular in (pi, wi). By condition (iii), they also satisfy increasing diﬀerences
in (pi, pj;wi, wj). Taking (ii) and (iii) together, the game is supermodular.
Thus, applying Milgrom and Roberts (1990, Th. 5) yields the result.
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We now clarify to what extent the conditions of Proposition 2 are likely
to hold.
First, consider the direct eﬀects in (i) given by
∂2πi
∂a∂pi
= −∂Dij
∂pi
> 0 and
∂2πi
∂a∂wi
=
∂Dji
∂wi
− ∂Dij
∂wi
.
The direct eﬀect of access charges on usage fees is always positive as higher
usage fees lead to less outgoing calls by Assumption 1’(v).13 The direct eﬀect
of access charges on net surpluses is less obvious. In the model proposed by
Laﬀont et al. (1998a), this eﬀect turns out to be zero, as demand functions
are given by
Dji = αi(wi, wj)(1− αi(wi, wj))q(pj),
Dij = αi(wi, wj)(1− αi(wi, wj))q(pi),
so that ∂Dji/∂wi = ∂Dij/∂wi for pi = pj.
Second, consider the within-player eﬀects (ii). Even without using the
demand decomposition, we obtain a somewhat lengthy expression for the
relevant cross-partial:
∂2πi
∂pi∂wi
=
∂Dii
∂wi
+ (pi − c)
∂2Dii
∂pi∂wi
+
∂Dij
∂wi
(20)
+ (pi − aj − c1 − c0)
∂2Dij
∂pi∂wi
+
∂ni
∂wi
v0 (pi) .
Rather than considering each term in (20), we highlight some major ef-
fects. There are clear forces supporting the idea of complementarity between
high usage fees and high net surpluses. For instance, we unambiguously have
∂Dii
∂wi
=
∂ni
∂wi
bmii + ni∂ bmii∂wi > 0.
Intuitively, this reflects the idea that with a high net surplus, the total num-
ber of subscribers and thus the volume of internal calls will be high, so that
the per-unit profits resulting from a higher usage fee apply to a greater cus-
tomer base. However, there are also counter-eﬀects. For instance, arguments
13The indirect eﬀects from the linear pricing model are no longer present, because sub-
scriptions only depend on prices via net surpluses.
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as in Section 2 show that
∂2Dii
∂pi∂wi
=
∂ni
∂wi
∂ bmii
∂pi
+ ni
∂ bmii
∂wi
is likely to be negative: A higher net surplus leads to more subscriptions.
Thus, the reduction in internal calls resulting from a higher usage fee has a
particularly strong negative demand eﬀect, as it applies to a greater number
of subscribers. More interestingly, there is a negative subscription charge
eﬀect that is specific to the non-linear case ((∂ni/∂wi) v0 (pi) < 0): When wi
is high, firm i has a large number of subscribers. Increasing the usage charge
means that the firm will be able to extract a smaller subscription charge from
each customer. This eﬀect is particularly pronounced when the number of
subscribers is large.
Finally, consider strategic interactions. First note that ∂2πi/∂pi∂pj = 0,
which is in line with condition (iii). The remaining cross-partials, however,
are typically ambiguous. For instance,
∂2πi
∂pi∂wj
=
∂Dii
∂wj
+ (pi − c)
∂2Dii
∂pi∂wj
+
∂Dij
∂wj
(21)
+ (p− aj − c1 − c0)
∂2Dij
∂pi∂wj
+
∂ni
∂wj
v0 (pi) ,
is very similar to (20), except that the derivatives are taken with respect
to wj rather than wi. Typically, however, derivatives with respect to wi
and wj have diﬀerent signs, which makes it unlikely that ∂2πi/∂pi∂wj and
∂2πi/∂pi∂wi have the same sign.
Summing up, there is some support for the intuitive notion that higher ac-
cess charges tend to both increase usage fees and decrease subscriber charges.
However, higher access charges may have positive direct eﬀects on fixed fees
(∂2πi/∂a∂wi ≤ 0) , even though this is not the case in the model proposed
Laﬀont et al. (1998a). Further, the strategic complementarity of the players’
two-dimensional decision vectors is not obvious. While this does not itself
imply that the conclusions of Proposition 2 do not hold–after all, these
conditions are merely suﬃcient rather than necessary–it does at least warn
us that straightforward intuitive reasoning may not apply under two-sided
network competition.
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5 Extensions and Conclusions
We finally discuss two important extensions of the ALRT framework that
have been studied in the literature: (i) customer heterogeneity (Dessein
2003), and (ii) price discrimination based on call termination (Laﬀont et
al. 1998b).
First, note that the extension to heterogeneous customers is straightfor-
ward, as our reduced-form demand functions Dii and Dij,i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j,
are perfectly consistent with customer heterogeneity: Suppose that there are
t types of customers indexed by k = 1, ..., t. Let nki denote the number of type
k customers subscribing to network i. Similarly, let bmkii and bmkij denote the
number of internal and external calls, respectively, per subscriber of type k.
Then, the demand for internal and external calls is given by Dii ≡
P
k n
k
ii bmkii
and Dij ≡
P
k n
k
i bmkij, respectively. Since Propositions 1 and 2 are formulated
in terms of reduced-form demand functions, they also apply when customers
are heterogenous. Therefore, the ambiguities with respect to possible collu-
sion over inflated access charges still emerge in this more general case, even
after extending our assumptions on the demand components to all t types of
customers.
Second, consider the case where networks charge diﬀerent retail prices for
internal and external calls. Following Laﬀont et al. (1998b), we denote the
retail price of network i for internal calls by pi and the price for external
calls by bpi.14 Clearly, we cannot simply reinterpret Propositions 1 and 2
to understand the suﬃcient conditions for retail prices to be increasing in
access charges in such a setting. Our above analysis suggests, though, that
collusion over inflated access charges is unlikely to be a robust phenomenon
in this more general setting, as it is inherently non-robust even in the special
case where pi ≡ bpi.15
Summing up, this paper provides a reduced-form analysis of the role of
access charges under two-way network competition with linear and non-linear
retail prices. Retaining the key features of network competition models but
14In the case of non-linear retail tariﬀs, network i also sets a subscriber charge Fi (as in
Section 4).
15Laﬀont et al. (1998b, 40), for instance, find that “raising each other’s cost does not
promote collusion” in their model with price discrimination.
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imposing less structure, we derive suﬃcient conditions for usage fees to be
increasing (and subscriber charges to be decreasing) in access charges. We
show that these conditions are diﬃcult to satisfy without making rather
strong assumptions on the demand for calls within and across networks,
suggesting that implementing collusion by inflating access charges is likely
to be non-feasible. Our results extend Dessein’s (2003) earlier finding that
making the analytical framework more general does not restore the collusive
eﬀect of a high access charge.
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